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CONSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION
BRAZIL IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
Thomas C . Bruneau *
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
On 5 October 1988, Brazil promulgated a new constitution of
315 articles. This event was the culmination of twenty months of
debate and discussion during which the 559-member Constituent
Assembly was the focal point of politics in Brazil. The
constitution is the eighth since Brazil became independent in
1822. Since it replaces the Constitution of 1967, amended in
1969, which was imposed by the military regime that governed
between 1964 and 1985, most Brazilian political commentators
consider it the keystone to the country's democratic consolidation
This conclusion is based on the open and democratic process
whereby virtually all political interests had access to the
Constituent Assembly which was popularly elected on 15 November
1986, as well as the resultant document which stipulates detailed
and extensive guarantees of democratic rights and processes. 1
* The research reported here was conducted with funds administered
by the Naval Postgraduate School Research Council
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In this paper I assess the prospects for democratic
consolidation in terms of the 1988 Constitution, and am
unfortunately not as sanguine as most of the Brazilian political
commentators. I want to convey here a sense of the context in
which the Constitution is to be implemented; this will not be in
terms familiar to Americans whose two hundred year old constitution
is sacrosanct. Initially it is obvious that constitutions have
been replaced in Brazil with a certain frequency, and the last
democratically elaborated constitution, that of 1946, was
overturned by the military coup in 1964. It is also relevant
that the new Constitution is promulgated at a time of unprecedented
economic crisis, thus creating serious political implications.
The economy has been in recession for most of the decade, the
country's debt has reached approximately $115 billion, and
inflation in 1988 was almost 1000%. There is real question
whether the stabilization plan of 15 January 1989, the third
Since 1985, will be any more Successful than the last two which
failed. Nineteen eighty-nine is a year of presidential elections,
the first direct elections for the president since 1960. The
potential for a radical i zat ion or polarization is high if the
results of the first elections held under the new Constitution
are considered. In the municipal elections of 15 November 1988,
the government party, the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement
Party) carried Salvador, Bahia, as its most important state
capital. The most important capital won by the other party in
government, the PFL (Liberal Front Party), was Recife, also in
the Northeast. The parties most active in opposition to the
federal government, the PT and PDT , carried the key capitals of
Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, and Curitiba. Even a
splinter from the PMDB , the PSDB , won in an important capital,
Belo Horizonte in Minas Gerais. The economic and political
context of post-promulgation Brazil is extremely unpromising;
such instability may be so perilous as to preclude the
implementation of the new Constitution.
To better understand the likelihood of democratic
consolidation through the Constitution, I will review the process
whereby it was formulated and the roles of important political
actors. This review will enable us to appreciate the interaction
of political forces at this stage of Brazil's democratic transition
and assess the factors which affect the implementation of the
Constitution in these perilous times. It may be useful to
provide first some comparative evidence on democratic consolidation
in which new constitutions figured centrally in the process. 8
Comparative Cases
The most comparable cases to Brazil's experience are the new
Iberian democracies which began their transitions at roughly the
same time (mid-1970s) and sought to cap the transitions with new
constitutions. Despite obvious external similarities, however,
the implications arising from the processes and resulting
documents in the three cases are very different.
In Portugal the transition was initiated by a coup on 25
April 1974, which brought on a revolution. In accord with
commitments by the Armed Forces Movement in making the coup,
elections were held exactly one year later for a Constituent
Assembly. In these elections the Socialist Party (PS) and the
Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) , both espousing Marxism at that
time, together had a majority of 151 seats in the 250 member
Assembly. The Assembly was constrained by the terms of a Pact
with the Armed Forces Movement which guaranteed them a continuing
role in politics. The deliberations of the Assembly were also
influenced by the fervor of the period, when at times it appeared
as though the process would be superseded by civil and military
revolutionary groups. The resultant document which was promulgated
on 25 April 1976 reflects these three conditioning factors. The
Armed Forces Movement was given a supervisory role in government,
and the document's 315 articles stipulate in extensive detail
that Portuguese economy and society would continue to be transformed
on the road to Socialism. In Sum, the Portuguese Constitution of
1976 was extremely programmatic and socialistic. 3
Due to external economic factors arising from Portugal's
relative underdevelopment, combined with domestic political
dynamics, the 1976 Constitution became a political issue soon
after promulgation. It was seen by private entrepreneurs as an
obstacle to development and by the political right as an impediment
to their attaining power. When the right, in the form of the
Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Social Democratic Center
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Party (CDS) , obtained a majority in the Parliament after 1979,
one of their main goals, and thus a central political theme,
became revision of the constitution. This was finally achieved
in September 1982. However, as the revision was made to the
detriment of the powers of the incumbent President Eanes , it was
destabilizing for government and the party system. And, as it
required support from the Socialist Party to achieve the necessary
two-thirds vote, it changed the socialistic economic and social
content only slightly. The revision, like the original document,
satisfied only limited sectors of the political elite.
Consequently, soon new demands were made for constitutional
revision and continue to be made until the present. By elaborating
such a detailed and programmatic document which can only be
comprehended in the revolutionary context of the time, the
Portuguese have ensured that some sections cannot be implemented,
others are irrelevant, and demands for revision will continue.
While maintaining the topic of the consitution in the public
view, it does little for establishing the legitimacy of the
document
.
In Spain the situation was very different. The Constitution
signed by King Juan Carlos I on 27 December 1978 finalized a
transition characterized by compromise and consensus. This
constitution stands in marked contrast to the Constitution of the
Second Republic of 1931 which, like the Portuguese Constitution
of 1976, was a document "imposed by one political tendency upon
the rest of the country....""* Whereas in Portugal the Socialists
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and Communists attempted to guarantee the revolutionary changes
and momentum by enshrining them in the Constitution, in Spain the
political elites sought to avoid the polarization of the Second
Republic culminating in the civil war of 1936-39.
The Constitution was written by the Cortez between August
1977 and October 1978, and ratified in a referendum in December
1978. The Constitution represents the end of the transition led
by Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez since his appointment by the King
in July 1976. Due to the composition of the Cortes where no
party or tendency held a majority, and the general agreement to
avoid polarization, the defining characteristic of Spanish
constitution-making was what Qunther has termed the 'politics of
consensus.' More precisely, the elites engaged in consociational
strategies whereby they sought compromises on potentially
conflictive issues, negotiations were conducted through 'summit
diplomacy' among the highest-ranking political leaders, the talks
were conducted in strict secrecy, and the constraints placed on




The challenge facing the Spanish political elites was
probably more serious than that facing the Portuguese insofar as
Spain has been characterized by more conflict, particularly
regarding regional autonomy and Church-state relations. Because
of the trauma of the civil war which ushered in forty years of
rule by Francisco Franco, the elites were well aware of the need
to compromise. The Constitution is composed of 169 articles; its
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length is due not to extensive socio-economic sections, but
rather to the delimitation of political processes to mollify
competing political groups. This political process has resulted
in an enviable situation where no significant political groups
challenge the legitimacy of the regime although the Constitution
is somewhat less acceptable to the Basques. The Portuguese were
less forward (or backward) looking: there had been no civil war
and they wanted to consolidate the profound changes brought about
by the demise of the Salazar-Cae tano regime. Much of what they
wanted to consolidate, however, was economically unrealistic and
politically limited to a specific time and conjuncture. When
these changed, ascendent political forces demanded that the
Constitution be amended; these demands continue."
Brazil's Negotiated Transition
On first examination it appears that Brazil's experience in
writing a new constitution should parallel Spain's in that the
transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes are similar. 7
The Brazilian transition was initiated from above as was Spain's,
took place in a country which was transformed from the time the
military took power in 1964, involved negotiations between the
regime and the opposition more or less centered on the PMDB
which was also something of a front like Adolfo Suarez' UCD
,
and included 'understandings' on the extent of tolerable change
which were similar to if less formal than the Pacts of Moncloa.*
The most obvious differences concern the decade-long span of the
Brazilian transition, its escape from control of the regime in
1984, and the absence of a king.
Symptomatic of these differences is the manner in which
constitutional change entered the political agenda during the
transitions. In Spain, Franco had passed seven basic laws over
thirty years which overlapped and never provided a coherent
constitutional framework for politics.® A constitution was thus
required to replace the personal rule of Franco and
institutionalize the emerging democratic system. In Brazil it
was more complicated.
In principle the Constitution of 1967, substantially amended
by the military in 1969 [and thus most consider it a new
constitution], could have been exorcised of its more authoritarian
elements and retained as the document for a democratic Brazil.
After all, in the political transitions of Argentina and
Uruguay both countries returned to their earlier constitutions
which had been either amended or superseded temporarily by the
military governments. It was in the context of Brazil' 3 long
drawn out political transition that the demand for a new
constitution emerged; it would later re-emerge when the transition
took a different turn.
The MDB first focused seriously on a new constitution in
response to the April Package of 1977, although the theme had
briefly emerged within the party in 1971. In the April Package,
President Geisel utilized the Fifth Institutional Act to change
the constitution in order to reemphasize control over the
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transition in line with his and not the opposition's priorities
and timetable. It became obvious to the opposition that the
transition would at best be slow and hesitant. As a prominent
leader of the MDB , Fernando Henrique Cardoso replied in 1977 in
response to a question on the desirability of focusing on a
constituent assembly, "Because the constituent assembly is the
means whereby political space can be opened to improve the
chances of the majority participating in Brazilian politics.
This is the real reason for proposing a constituent assembly...
It is simply an effort in the context of a very negative
correlation of forces." 10 The MDB then promoted a campaign for a
constituent assembly, the first it had promoted outside of
election campaigns, since it was founded a decade earlier. The
theme appeared in MDB (and post-1979 PMDB) documents up to and
including Tancredo Neves ' s speech on being elected president by
the electoral college on 15 January 1985. For Neves a new
constitution would finalize the transition from the military to
civilian regime.
In 1977, other organizations also in opposition to President
Geisel and the regime promoted the theme of a new constitution.
The theme became the unifying force for the opposition to demand
a more rapid and profound political transition. In August 1977
the Order of Brazilian Lawyers (OAB) published a document
entitled "Carta aos Brasileiros" which advocated a return to the
state of law. In the same year the National Conference of
Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) published "Exigencias Cristas de uma
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Ordem Politica" which advocated a similar goal. A general
consensus gradually developed which focused on the need to
replace the documents of the military regime with a new
constitution both in order to signify a break with the military
and to consolidate a democratic regime.
The Popular Movements and the Constituent Assembly
Following the death of Tancredo Neves in April 1985 and the
inauguration of Jose Sarney , the need to make a break with the
past via a new constitution seemed less imperative. A government
was formed based on the PMDB and the PFL which seemed reasonably
comfortable utilizing even some of the authoritarian measures of
the 1967/1969 constitutions. However, in the context of the
conciliated transition, the coming to power of the PMDB, and the
fear that little would be changed, other opposition elements
began to focus on the constituent assembly as the way to make the
break with the past. These elements included the OAB , CNBB , the
Workers' Party (PT) , some unions, and a wide variety of grass
roots organizations. Many of these so-called popular movements
came together in the umbrella Plenario Pro-Par ticipacao Popular
na Constituent (Plenary) , which was closely linked to the Church
and grass roots groups. 11 As stated by one of their proponents,
"The convocation of a Constituent Assembly is, today, a natural
and necessary consequence of the campaign [in 1984] for direct
elections. It is necessary to complete this campaign and,
mainly, extend its goal. We want not only the direct election of
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the president of the Republic, but also to open spaces in order
to begin a cycle of profound change in the economic and social
policies of the regime, and mainly, to bring an end to the
military regime itself." 12
The Plenary, and its component parts, promoted political
mobilization and the development of awareness through publications,
meetings, press campaigns, and pressure group techniques. They
made five demands regarding a constituent assembly, whereby the
prospects for making the break with the past would be maximized.
The first was a change in state representation prior to
calling elections to a constituent assembly. Each state is
entitled to three senators, regardless of population. In the
Chamber no state can have fewer than eight deputies nor more than
sixty. This means that the more industrialized, and populated,
states in the South are underrepresented and the underdeveloped
states of the North and Northeast, where cl ientel ist ic politics
prevail, are overrepresented . Thus a constituent assembly
elected according to the actual system of representation would
seriously underrepresent the more modern states. 13 Also
related, and criticized by some scholars as well as the popular
movements, is the system of representation where the voters elect
on a state-wide and not district basis. The relationship between
the voters and their representatives is thus distant; this
situation is aggravated by the long tenure of senators (eight
years) and deputies (four). The members of the Plenary argued
that without change in the system and numbers of representation
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the result would be a distant and unrepresentative constituent
assembly
.
The second point involved the elimination of the entulho
autori tar io (authoritarian rubbish) prior to calling elections.
This legislation was left over from the military regime and
included the Law of National Security, the Press Law, laws
prohibiting strikes, and the like. 1 * The Congress had not
changed any of this legislation after mid-1985, and a good deal
of it was used by the Sarney government. Even though the
legislation might not have been used to control the elections for
and deliberations in a constituent assembly, the Plenary argued
that its mere existence restricted the independence of the
constituent process.
Thirdly, the Plenary argued that the constituent assembly be
called exclusively to frame a new constitution and its members
need not belong to political parties; they could run as
independents. They assumed that the exclusive constituent
assembly would be disbanded after writing the constitution, and
professional politicians would avoid it. Independents would open
up possibilities for broader representation. The Plenary sought
to allow for the widest representation possible thereby linking
the lower classes to the new constitution.
The fourth point sought to promote further popular
involvement, and thus the legitimacy of the document among the
public. The Plenary wanted a plebiscite - if not for separate
sections of the constitution at least for the document as a
12
whole
And, lastly, the members of the Plenary also wanted the
people to "write their own constitution," at least to some
degree. They specifically opposed the creation of a group of
notables whose mandate it was to prepare a draft constitution for
the president. This idea had originated with Tancredo Neves and
was expanded by President Sarney , who appointed a group of 51
notables from academia, the arts, and the legal profession, in
mid-1985. In the view of the Plenary, this group overwhelmingly
represented the elite and its very existence would stifle popular
creat ivi ty
.
Taken together, the implementation of these five points
would, according to the Plenary, promote involvement in politics
by the lower classes, encourage them to pressure the constituent
assembly for a document guaranteeing their interests, and allow
for an accurate representation of interests in Brazilian society. 10
Despite a high level of mobilization and publicity, none of
the demands were adopted. President Sarney proposed a project to
the Congress on 28 June 1985 which would amend the constitution
and call a National Constituent Assembly composed of the two
houses of Congress to begin meeting on 31 January 1987. In late
November, the Congress passed legislation in line with this
project whereby the Congress to be elected on 15 November 1986
would also serve as the constituent assembly. The system of
representation was not changed, the authoritarian legislation
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remained, and candidates had to be members of political parties.
A proposal had been formulated in a congressional committee
headed by a PMDB deputy from Sao Paulo, Flavio Bierrenbach, which
would have allowed the voters to decide by plebiscite whether the
constituent assembly would be in the Congress or exclusive, and
provided for other plebiscites. The Plenary was very much
involved in this proposal. It was, however, defeated in committee
by the combination not only of the PFL and PDS , but also the
PMDB. According to Bierrenbach, though he was never informed, it
was understood from the beginning that the constituent assembly
would be the Congress. 16
The Commission of notables, known as the Comissao Afonso
Arinos after its chairman, met between mid-1985 and late 1986.
Initially rejected by the Plenary, it was later criticized by
conservatives when it presented its project to President Sarney
in September 1986. The project was not only incredibly detailed,
with 468 articles, but also nationalistic and populistic. Among
other things, the Commission recommended a parliamentary system
of government and a four-year presidential tenure. President
Sarney was not interested in either proposal, received the draft,
and buried it.
The prospects for making a break through the constituent
assembly thus appeared increasingly less promising. Virtually
none of their proposals were adopted, and the overall theme of
the constituent assembly received little attention in the media.
In the general elections of 15 November 1986, the constituent
14
assembly was downplayed and attention, instead focused on the
election of the state governors. In these elections the PMDB did
extremely well winning 22 of 23 governorships and receiving a
majority of 302 seats in the 559-member Congress. The PFL , also
involved in government, came in second with 135 seats. These
results can be explained in large part by the popularity of
President Sarney and the PMDB-PFL government during the Cruzado
Plan which the President decreed in late February 1986. By this
decree inflation was eliminated, prices were fixed, and salaries
also fixed but at a relatively high level. The result was a
burst of consumer spending, generalized euphoria, and great
public acclaim for President Sarney and the government. The
popularity was reflected in the election results. President
Sarney and the government repeatedly stated their commitment to
maintain the Cruzado Plan even though economists indicated it had
to be modified, and goods either completely disappeared from
stores or consumers had to pay a premium. Two days after the
elections the Cruzado Plan was scrapped and President Sarney's
popularity with it. 17 The problems of the economy were exacerbated
rather than resolved by the Cruzado Plan; indeed, economic
problems would serve as the ever-present backdrop for the
deliberations of the constituent assembly. Not only did the
assembly begin in February 1987 but Brazil also declared a
moratorium on paying the interest on its huge foreign debt. It
was thus in the midst of economic crisis, declining prestige of
President Sarney, and a frustrated Plenary and affiliated
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movements that the Constituent Assembly began its work after
Carnival 1987.
The Political Context Surrounding Drafting the Constitution
Between 1 February 1987 and October 1988, the Constituent
Assembly was the focus of politics in Brazil. The final document
of 245 articles plus 70 transitory articles was the result of 330
sessions, 70,000 amendments, and 14,000 speeches. The anticipated
completion date was extended four times, and there were several
major shifts in the orientation of various sections and finally
the whole document. A brief review of some aspects will allow us
to better understand the political dynamics and the resultant
shifts.
The political scene was fluid, or better complicated, and
would become even more so during the negotiations in the Assembly.
Unlike Portugal and Spain, no formal pact existed between the
regime and the opposition. Prior to his election, Tancredo Neves
entered into a Series of "understandings" with key elements of
the regime, including the military. These were not documented;
after his death the tenor of the various understandings would be
a matter for speculation and political battle - as evidenced by
the fate of the Bierrenbach project. 16 The Assembly began from
scratch in that Sarney chose to withhold the Comissao Afonso
Arinos draft constitution, and the political parties, except for
the PT
,
had given virtually no attention to the Assembly, and its
tasks, prior to its opening in February 1987. xs
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The political scene was made even more unstable by the
relationship between the executive, Sarney , and the Assembly
where the PMDB had a comfortable majority. Sarney of course had
been the president of the regime party, Democratic Social Party
(PDS) , and only joined the PMDB in 1984 when Tancredo Neves
developed the strategy to win indirect election in the Electoral
College through splitting the PDS. On Neves ' s death some wanted
his contemporary, Ulysses Guimaraes, President of the PMDB to
take power. This did not happen because of concern for establishing
legitimacy, but Guimaraes did assume the Presidency of the
Chamber of Deputies and then of the Constituent Assembly. Thus
Sarney held executive power; under the 1967/69 Constitutions this
power was tremendous. For example, he decreed the Cruzado Plan
in February 1986, did not consult with Guimaraes in advance, and
the Congress only had to get around to approve it two months
later. Yet Guimaraes would hold more power than any other single
individual regarding the Assembly and the new constitution. In a
certain sense Brazil became a two phased diarchy: Sarney held
power in the present, while Guimaraes sought to define the nature
of power in the future.
Conflicts between Sarney and Guimaraes were obvious when the
Assembly was convoked; as the former attempted to limit the
interim sovereignty of the Assembly, the latter sought to expand
it. President Sarney was particularly concerned about his tenure
which would be defined by the Assembly. According to the 1967/69
constitutions, as amended, it was six years; Neves had indicated
17
he would govern for four as the last indirectly elected president,
and Sarney initially reiterated Neves ' s commitment. With his
popularity declining at the end of the Cruzado Plan, Sarney came
out publicly on 18 May 1987 for a five-year term in order to
regain his lost prestige. From then on his main goal would be to
inveigle the five years from the Assembly.
In the unicameral Constituent Assembly the PMDB and the PFL
totalled 436, or 78% of the 559 seats. 20 The PMDB, however, had
changed and expanded tremendously since entering government in
March 1985. In line with the tradition of flexibility and lack
of ideological and organizational coherence of Brazilian political
parties, the party was wide open to new members. David Fleischer
has shown that the largest political group in the Assembly was
not the PMDB but, in terms of 1977 political affiliations, the
ARENA (precursor to the PDS as government party) with 217
members. The more original or authentic PMDB had but 212. Of
the 298 PMDB members on whom data was available in 1987, 40 were
from the PDS in 1983 and another 42 were from ARENA in 1979.
Thus rather than a majority of 54% in the Assembly, the PMDB
could count only 40% once these latecomers from its right were
excluded. 21 Even if Guimaraes was President of the PMDB,
Chamber, and Assembly it did not mean that he, much less Sarney,
could assume the Party would vote as directed. This fact made
the process that much more complicated.
Other actors beyond the political parties became involved in
the constituent process. Traditionally, political parties have
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not been the key actors of politics in Brazil. During democratic
periods individual personalities have been in the forefront;
during the military regime the armed forces as institution are
central. Interest representation during both periods has always
been less through parties and more via a limited number of
organized economic interests.
Although the popular movement did not initially succeed in
its goals for the Assembly, the members remained active. After
the elections, the eruption of the economic crisis, the decline
in Sarney ' s popularity, and the opening of the Assembly, the
CNBB , OAB , some unions, and other movements involved in the
Plenary sought to define the issues and then influence the
Assembly; still to make a break via the constitution. At the
minimum they promoted a momentum to focus attention on the
significance of the Assembly and a new constitution. The
Assembly would of necessity become the focal point for interests
and pressure groups seeking to achieve their competing goals. As
the popular movements wanted change, others would have to become
involved to secure what they already had. All interests wanted
their goals incorporated into the basic charter of the nation.
This is particularly relevant as it was clear from the beginning
that the new constitution would be long, detailed, and
programmatic. At the minimum it was expected to exceed the 312
articles of the Portuguese Constitution of 1976. The deliberations
of the Assembly were as long, drawn out, volatile, and polemic as
these initial considerations would lead one to anticipate.
19
Progression and Regression in the Constituent Assembly
In contrast to the experience in 1946 when a "Grand Committee*
drafted a document in four months and the Assembly voted it in
another three, the Assembly in 1987 went into what David Fleischer
terms a "total participation mode". 22 The 559 members were
divided into eight large committees by content areas to take
testimony and draft sections of a working document. The committees
were then further divided into three sub-committees. Another
committee, the twenty- f i f th , was created to systematize and
integrate the final reports from the eight committees. Due to
the influence of progressives in the PMDB and pressure by the
popular movements, the process was extremely open. The committees
were open to suggestions by all associations and movements, the
debates were held in public, and there was provision for "Popular
Amendments" whereby an item would have to be considered by the
twenty- f i fth , or Sys temati zat ion Committee, if it received 30,000
signatures and was supported by three associations. There were
finally 122 Popular Amendments which received twelve million
signatures. i3 In June the eight committees combined their
respective three sub-committee reports into their final reports
which went to the 90 member Systemat izat ion Committee. The
Committee was chaired by Senator Afonso Arinos, and the more
powerful position of relator was held by Senator Bernardo Cabral
.
The Committee enjoyed considerable autonomy as it produced one
working draft in July and another in September. The Committee
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was dominated by more liberal elements from the PMDB , aligned
with Senator Covas , and other parties which had extensive
contacts with the popular movements. Further, the progressives
were constantly present, whereas the more conservative elements
had business interests out of Brasilia and were absent most of
the time. Consequently when the Sys temat izat ion Committee
presented the final draft of 351 articles in November there were
a number of innovative elements including the following: adoption
of a parliamentary system, a mixed electoral system,
decentralization of taxing powers to states and municipalities,
increases in the powers of Congress thereby diminishing those of
the executive, guarantees of extensive labor rights and allowing
for expropriation of idle land, and prohibiting public funds for
private schools. Whereas future presidential terms were set at
five years, Sarney's was shortened to four. The parliamentary
system was to be adopted immediately on promulgation of the
constitution. 2 *
The economic innovations mobilized business sectors against
the draft, and the change in system of government and decrease in
tenure incensed Sarney . Under the ruled adopted at the beginning
of deliberations, voting by the full Assembly on the Committee
draft would be as follows: preference would be given to their
version prior to considering amendments; only if it was defeated
or lacked the quorum of 280 would amendments be allowed. The
opponents to the draft mobilized and formed a conservative inter-
party coalition called the "Centrao" or big center. By bringing
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almost all of its members to Brasilia in December it obtained
sufficient votes to change the rules governing voting procedures.
From then on any amendment with more than the absolute majority
of 280 signatures would take precedence in voting. Only if the
amendments failed would the Committee's version stand. In late
January 1988, the Assembly began voting on the draft which was
completed in June. A second stage, during which articles could
be eliminated but none added, took place between July and
September
.
The "Centrao" included not only the PFL , PSD, and PTB but
also approximately 100 members of the (expanded) PMDB . ao Whereas
the Sys tematizat ion Committee was fairly cohesive and produced a
final draft with innovative elements, the "Centrao" was neither.
It was generally conservative but consensus was contingent,
depending on the issue at hand. This signified that virtually
every article had to be negotiated, and there was no assumption
of a majority. Indeed, to further complicate the process, the
PMDB was coming apart during the process with the PSDB splinter
with 7 senators and 38 deputies founded before the constitution
was promulgated in October; in addition, the president of the
PFL, Senator Marco Maciel, had already broken with Sarney in
September 1987. The already fractured party system thus came
apart while lobbies of all types predominated. This is relevant
as it encouraged diverse political pressures from all sides on
the Assembly and made for an incredible variety of at times
bizarre ad hoc alliances.
22
The Constitution of 1988
The final document reflects, and as we shall see reinforces,
the political process involved in its elaboration. President
Sarney pulled out all stops in cajoling, threatening, and buying
votes to achieve a five-year term in a presidential system. He
involved the military ministers, especially Minister of the Army
General Leonidas Pires Goncalves, in publicly supporting him,
distributed government funds to allies, and bought off others by
assigning radio and TV licenses. The two critical votes were on
22 March 1988 which was the first and only time all 559 members
were present and voting in the Assembly. The presidential system
passed relatively easily as the PDT and PT were in favor of it
regardless of Sarney. The five-year mandate barely passed, and
after that the "Centrao" was pulled apart by different positions
on most issues. The only point of unity after 22 March was in
mid-May when the section on agrarian reform was defeated, thereby
pushing the situation back beyond the Castello Branco government's
Land Statute of 1965. Productive land, even if not fulfilling a
social function, cannot be expropriated. Aside from this key
area, extensive reforms were included in the Constitution.
The Constitution stipulates a fundamental redistribution of
power. The executive, whose powers increased tremendously during
the military regime, is weakened in relationship to Congress, and
the union is diminished in relation to other levels of government.
Decree laws, which became the most common form of passing
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legislation during the military regime, and continuing under the
civilian government after 1985, must be approved by the Congress
within 30 days. The Congress has extensive powers in economic
areas such as changing budgetary items and overseeing the process
of economic decision-making. Congress must now approve all
international agreements, including those on the debt. It also
has oversight on the nuclear program. States and municipalities
are to receive increased shares of tax receipts. The federal
government is restricted in creating new revenue sources and in
expanding the public enterprise sector. The Central Bank is
prohibited from financing the public sector deficit by printing
money
.
The Constitution includes provisions for tremendous
improvements in human rights and social guarantees with incredibly
detailed sections on everything from censorship to maternity
leave. Education should benefit as the federal government is
obliged to increase its contribution from 13% to 18% of total
expenditures. There are also a variety of means of popular
participation which, in addition to the vote, include the
initiative, plebiscite, referendum, and popular veto. Organized
labor benefitted with a 44-hour workweek, a maximum of 6 hours
per shift, and unrestricted right to strike. The overall tone of
the Constitution is nationalistic, populistic, and statist.
Foreign firms are proscribed from prospecting and exploitation of
the subsoil, and the foreign firms currently involved in mining
have five years to cede majority control to Brazilians. The
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concept of a "national company" with headquarters and directors
in Brazil, or which the owners of most of the capital are
Brazilian, is defined with extensive benefits in access to
strictly defined markets and a variety of incentives over foreign
firms. There are provisions on sports, Indians, the environment,
and culture. A few stipulations appear positively weird,
especially in the Brazilian context, such as setting a 12% limit
on real interest rates and guaranteeing paternity leave.
Because of the major social and economic reforms, and the
redistribution of power and wealth between governments and within
the federal government itself, Sarney went on national television
in late July 1988 and described the first draft as a document
that would bankrupt Brazil and make it ungovernable. He urged
the Assembly to reject it which would have pushed the process
back to the beginning. The day after Sarney ' s speech Ulysses
Guimaraes called for the vote on the first draft which passed
with a massive majority of 403 to 13. Voting was completed on
the second round on 1 September and promulgation was on 5
October. By this time Sarney was politically isolated, his
government consisting largely of the PDS and some old friends.
The 1988 Constitution and Democratic Consolidation
The document produced during twenty months in the 559-member
Constituent Assembly is impressive in its scope, detail, and
overall orientation. It provides something for everyone in
Brazil with the exception of millions of generally poverty-
25
stricken landless peasants. £<a In order to evaluate the chances for
its overall implementation we must consider a number of factors.
With such a detailed document, particularly one which includes
extensive sections on the economy and factors beyond the control
of any country such as interest rates, it would be unrealistic to
anticipate full implementation. Earlier Brazilian constitutions
were not fully implemented nor, for that matter, were sections of
the Portuguese Constitution of 1976. 27 In addition, it is more
appropriate to think of the Brazilian process of formulating a
new constitution as open-ended. The work was not completed on 5
October 1988: it is an ongoing process. To even begin to
implement this document requires the passing of 314 items of
ordinary legislation and 56 of complementary legislation. This
process only began in late November, 47 days after the
promulgation. 2 * Further, Article 2 of the transitory items
provides for a plebiscite on 7 September 1993 on the form
(republic or constitutional monarchy) , and the system
(parliamentary or presidential) of government. And, Article 3
provides for amendment after five years by an absolute majority
of the Congress. In sum, the 1988 Constitution remains somewhat
tentative by design of its framers; this is well within the
Brazilian tradition of negotiation and conciliation.
Beyond these initial qualifications what are the relevant
factors to consider in assessing likely implementation?
These can be divided into two different, albeit overlapping
categories. First are those emerging from the process, and
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verified in the document, which deal with political structures.
Second are the more conjunctural factors conditioning the
Constitution as it was promulgated.
In the first category are four main factors.
1. Brazil's transition from a military to civilian regime is
unique in that the role of the armed forces has diminished
minimally, if at all. 2 * Article 142 stipulates, in part, "Their
[the armed forces] purpose is to defend the fatherland, guarantee
the constitutionally established powers and - upon the initiative
of any of said powers - law and order." This is essentially the
same role they have played since the founding of the Republic in
1891. It is important to note that their structures were not
diminished by creating, for example, a Ministry of Defense. The
National Security Council was replaced by a Council of National
Defense but it is merely consultative. The armed forces came
through the transition unscathed and began a modernization
program with the inception of the civilian regime. They lobbied
effectively in the Constituent Assembly and their prominence and
prestige increased as President Sarney , with little political
base of his own, relied upon them for support. They thus remain
at the center of power in fact and in terms of the constitution.
2. The Constituent Assembly/Congress increased its powers
while simultaneously reducing those of the executive. Thus even
though the proposal for a parliamentary system was defeated, the
constitutional powers of the Congress approximate those of some
parliamentary or semi -presidential systems. The Congress now has
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power but lacks the tradition, means, and possibly commitment to
exercise such power responsibly. This may result in the Congress
impeding and not initiating necessary legislation. 30
3. The process involved in formulating the Constitution did
nothing to strengthen political parties which could conceivably
increase the ability of the Congress to exercise its powers
responsibly. The PMDB and the PFL , who were the main actors due
to their overwhelming majority in the Assembly, were so divided
in early 1989 they could not agree on presidential candidates.
It is significant that there was no change in the Constitution
that might strengthen political parties in the future. The
earlier legislation pertaining to political parties remained, and
the district system of representation was not adopted. These
elements, which could result in change in the parties in the
future, did not even emerge as pertinent issues in the Assembly.
Even the highly unrepresentative number of deputies remained more
or less intact with a minimum of eight per state and a maximum of
70.
4. There was also little change in the key area of State-
labor relations though labor gained as an interest or class. Key
elements from the 1930s have been retained, including the
exclusive role of one union in a locale and the obligatory
collection of union dues by the state. 31 A greater percentage of
the dues now go to the union which can also collect additional
dues. Unions, however, are still dependent on grants of authority
from the government and are thus still linked to the state but
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have more power in their specific locales.
5. While unions retain a close link with the state, and
political parties are fragmented, there was an explosion of new
actors involved in politics. The popular movement emphasized
direct access to the Assembly via the Popular Amendments and a
number of instruments for popular participation were included in
the Constitution. It is likely that most of these movements will
work at the margins of the parties, though some are affiliated
with the PT . Also on the margins are the equally new phenomenon
of lobbies. Lobbies of all imaginable variations, from religious
associations to ecological groups to business interests worked on
the Assembly. Indeed, by one estimate one-half of the members of
the Assembly were themselves representatives of lobbies. 32 It is
likely that lobbies will continue to proliferate now that the
access points in the political and financial systems have
expanded with redistribution of power from the executive and the
union
.
Indeed, the process and the final document have resulted in
a continuing central role for the military and an almost
corporatist relationship with labor and the state. The innovations
are either questionable in implementation, as with Congress, or
clearly centrifugal in the case of parties, popular movements, and
lobbies. It thus appears that the result of the process is a
weaker political framework with which to implement the very
demanding constitution.
In the second category are two considerations which aggravate
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the above. 1. The process of writing the Constitution was so
drawn out and polemic that its legitimacy may be doubted from the
beginning. Sarney attacked the Assembly for more than a year and
then attempted to avoid implementing the Constitution in spirit
if not in letter during its first few months. Also, while most
interests are guaranteed in the Constitution so are their likely
opponents. By guaranteeing so much the Assembly may in fact be
guaranteeing nothing.
2. The Constitution comes into effect during an unprecedented
economic crisis. The crisis is due in part to the process
involved in the elaboration of the Constitution. Sarney maintained
the Cruzado Plan until after the 15 November 1986 elections which
guaranteed the success of the PMDB , but the economy suffered. He
did not implement the Bresser Plan in the second half of 1987
because he feared the austerity measures would further harm his
popularity. And he used government resources to obtain votes in
the Assembly. The socio-economic orientation of the Constitution
diverges from the orientation implemented by the Sarney Government
since mid-1988. These grave contradictions in policy orientation
do not promote dealing effectively with the problems. The
Constitution may thus come to be identified by the people as not




The Spanish Constitution of 1978 was framed by a relatively
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small group of political actors in a process characterized by
negotiation involving compromise and resulting in consensus. In
seeking to avoid a repetition of the Civil War, they wrote a
document that is realistic and legitimate for the vast majority
of the population. It is not a politicized issue today and is
amended in a regularized manner. The Portuguese Constitution of
1978, amended in 1982, was framed by the whole 250 member
Constituent Assembly in which the left held a majority. The
members sought to guarantee the revolutionary changes and
continue them into the future by inclusion in the Constitution.
Instead, economic realities and domestic political changes
resulted in simply ignoring some sections of the document and
demands for constitutional revision. Despite revision of the
political sections in 1982, demands still continue for more
revision
.
The Brazilian experience in framing a new constitution is
closer to the Portuguese, but more extreme. As the transition
controlled from above went out of control, so did the Constituent
Assembly. Due to the weak political base of President Sarney
,
the nature and composition of the PMDB , and the pressure of the
popular movements and lobbies, there was minimal coherence in the
process and in the Assembly itself. The President won on the two
items of most interest to him and the right beat down agrarian
reform, but the overall tenor of the 1988 Constitution is
progressive, populist, statist, and nationalist. This was
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simply including virtually everything most groups (with the
notable exception of the peasants) demanded. Thus whereas the
Spanish Constitution has 169 articles, the Brazilian has 315; it
can be argued that due to regional problems the former's would be
longer. In contrast to Portugal, which with 312 articles is
almost as long as Brazil's, there was no revolution and the left
did not have a majority. Rather, some movements wanted to make a
break with the past via the Constitution and the largely
conservative political actors in the Assembly lacked sufficient
coherence to resist.
In Spain the Constitution itself is not a political issue,
except for some of the Basques. In Portugal it continues to be,
and substantial political instability continued until a majority
government was elected in 1987. In Brazil there is less concern
about pol i ticizat ion of the 1988 Constitution; rather, it may
come to be considered irrelevant due to the lack of fit between
its tenor and the economic, political, and reality of the country
it purports to guide. It guarantees much but it is unlikely
that the economic resources or the political structures will be
emerge for its implementation. Rather it is likely that its
future, just as its elaboration, will be determined by short-term
political goals of competing political elites.
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NOTES
1. The reception of the final document was overwhelmingly
positive. In its extensive review of the Constitution the liberal
weekly newsmagazine Ve j a , for example, had as the lead title "The
Document of the powers of a people" followed by "The Constitutent
Assembly completes its work and creates the broadest regime of
public liberties in the country's history." Shortly after was
stated "The fact is that the Constituent Assembly has the
authority of the 69 million citizens who voted in 1986, and the
new Document is a picture of their sovereignty." Ve j a , September
7, 1988, p. 32. In a recent paper an ex-Finance Minister and
professor of Economics wrote "... Congress just finished writing
a new constitution which was freely debated and approved- a
constitution that is no one's dream, that is too much conservative
for the left, and too much progressist for the right, but that is
indeed the best compromise that Brazilian society could eventually
produce today. For all these reasons we do have a democratic
regime in Brazil, and a new Constitution that, in spite of the
faults we may attribute to it, is a positive factor for the
consolidation of democracy in Brazil." Luis Carlos Bresser
Pereira, "Economic Ideologies and Democracy in Brazil," paper
presented to seminar on L ' International isation de la Democratie
Politique, Universite de Montreal, September 28- October 5, 1988,
p. 6.
An English translation of the 1988 Constitution is available in
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, (FBIS-LAT-88-233S)
Monday, December 5, 1988.
2. It should be emphasized that the focus here is on democratic
consolidation about which little has been written. On the
earlier stages of political transitions there is abundant
material available. For a review of the literature and an
argument on how to approach the topic see Thomas Bruneau and




3. For more detail on this topic and references to the relevant
literature see Chapter 6, "The Constitution of 1976 and its
Revision in 1982" in Thomas Bruneau and Alex Macleod, Politics in
Contemporary Portugal: Parties and the Consolidation of Democracy
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1986).
4. Richard Gunther and Roger Blough, "Religious Conflict and
Consensus in Spain: A Tale of Two Constitutions," World Affairs
143, no 4, Spring 1981, p 366. Also on this topic see Richard
Gunther, "Constitutional Change in Contemporary Spain," in Keith
Banting and Richard Simeon, eds
.
, Redesigning the State: The
Politics of Constitutional Change (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1985)
, pp. 42-70; Richard Gunther, 'Democratization and
Party Building: The Role of Party Elites in the Spanish Transition,"
in Robert Clark and Michael Haltzel, eds., Spain in the 1980's:
The Democratic Transition and a New International Role (Cambridge:
Ballinger, 1987), pp. 35-65; and, Andrea Bonime-Blanc , Spain '
s
Transition to Democracy: The Politics of Constitution-making
(Boulder: Westview, 1987).
5. Gunther and Blough, p. 402.
6. For an eloquent appeal for revision by ex-prime minister
Francisco Pinto Balsemao see, "The Constitution and Politics:
Options for the Future," in Kenneth Maxwell, ed
.
, Portugal in the
1980's: Dilemmas of Democratic Consolidation (N.Y.: Greenwood Press,
1986)
, pp. 197-232.
7. There is a rich literature on the Brazilian transition. See
for example my "Consolidating Civilian Brazil," Third World
Quarterly 7, No. 4, October 1985; Wayne Selcher, ed . , Pol i tical
Liberalization in Brazil (Boulder: Westview, 1986); and, Julian
M. Chacel , et. al
.
, eds., Brazil's Economic and Political Future
(Boulder: Westview, 1988.) Maybe the richest documentation is
found in Jose Augusto Guilhon de Albuquerque and Eunice Ribeiro
Durham, eds. , Simposio: A Transicao Politica . (Sao Paulo:
Universidade de Sao Paulo, 1987) .
8. The similarities in the 'transitions through transaction' are
highlighted in Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions
Through Transaction: Democratization in Brazil and Spain," in
Wayne Selcher, 1986, pp. 175-216.
9. These are discussed in Bonime-Blanc, p. 19.
10. Movimient o August 1977.
11. In late 1985 and the first half of 1986 I reserched on the
Plenary and its constituent groups through their documents,
interviews, and attendance at meetings. In May 1988 I returned




12. Helio Bicuco, "0 verdadeiro caminho da democracia," in
Raymundo Faodo , et. al
.
, Constituente e Democracia no Brazil Hoje
(Sao Paulo: Brasiliense, 1985), p. 186.
13. According to a weighting scheme developed by Raymundo Faoro
,
a voter in Rio de Janeiro has a value of 1; this drops to .6 in
Sao Paulo; in Maranhao it is 1.8 and 12.1 in Acre. Raymundo
Faoro, " Cons t i tuinte : a verdade e o sofisma," in Faoro, ed
.
,
1985, p. 13. For an historical overview and analysis of the topic
see Maria d'Alva Gil Kinzo, Representacao Politica e Sistema
Eleitoral no Brasil (Sao Paulo: Simbolo, 1980). A more recent
analysis of this and broader themes of the parties is Qlaucio
Dillon Soares , Colegio Eleitoral, Convencoes Partidarias e
Eleicoes Diretas (Petropolis: Editora Vozes , 1984).
14. This legislation is discussed in Dalmo Dallari, "Entulho
Autoritario: Como nos velhos tempos," in Barbara Freitag, et.
al
.
, Nova Republica: Urn Balanco (Sao Paulo: L & PM, 1986), pp.
155-67.
15. These five themes figure largely in CEDI , Dossie Especial:
Const i tuinte and were dealt with in most of the newsletters in
1985-86 of the Plenary. For a historical perspective and a good
summary on most of the themes see Marilia Garcia, Que e
Constituinte (Sao Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1985).
16. Interview with Deputy Flavio Bierrenbach on May 28, 1986 in
Brasilia. The extensive hearings of the committee are available
in the Diario de Congresso Nacional of November- December 1985.
(Comissao Mista, incubida de estudo e parecer sobre as Propostas
de Emenda a Constituicao nos 43, 44 e 52 de 1985, que 'convocam a
Assembleia Nacional Constituinte').
17. In early November 1986 80% of the respondents expressed
confidence in the President. By March 1988 this figure was 33%.
Or, whereas in the latter month 16% considered his administration
"good" or "excellent" some 43% considered it "bad" or "lousy".
Cited in Orjan Olsen and Silvia Cervellini, "Transition to
Democracy in Brazil: The Search for Leadership and Principles" a
report from the Instituto Brasileiro de Opiniao Publica e
Estatistica Ltda, presented to the WAP0R/AAP0R Conference,
Toronto, May 18-22, 1988.
18. On Neves' understanding with the military and the PFL see the
report on a speech by Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Folha
de Sao Paulo May 19, 1986 and David Fleischer, "From Non-Competitive
to Competitive Elections to the 1987/88 Constituent Assembly:
Brazil's Attempt to Finalize the Political Transition" a paper
for the Academia de Humanismo Cristiano, Santiago, Chile, 23
March 1988, p. 36.
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19. The draft prepared for the PT was a contribution to encourage
discussion of the new constitution, but by representing a major
break with the past was not a document on which any initial
consensus could be built. See Fabio Konder Comparato , Mud
a
Brasil: Urna Constituicao para o Desenvol vimento Democratico (Sao
Paulo: Editora Brasiliense, 1986).
20. The numbers for the other parties are as follows; PDS- 40,
PDT- 25, PTB- 18, PT- 16, and seven minor parties, including two
Communist parties, 24.
21. David Fleischer, "From Non-Competitive to Competitive
Eections . . .
" , p. 39. Fleischer provides in this paper extensive
details on the background on the members of the assembly. On the
flexibility of the parties see Bolivar Lamounier and Rachel
Meneguello, "Partidos politicos e consolidacao democratica:
caso Brasileiro" (mimeo) IDESP, 1986. On the background of the
PMDB see Maria d'Alva Gil Kinzo, "An Opposition Party in an
Authoritarian Regime: The Case of the MDB (Movimento Democratico
Brasileiro) in Brazil, 1966-1979" D.Phil. Thesis, Oxford, 1985.
22. David Fleischer, "The Impact of the 1988 Municipal Elections
on Brazil's 1989 Presidential Election", p. 13. (mimeo) A paper
prepared for the Institute of Interamer ican Studies at the
University of Miami, February, 1989.
23. On the overall process involved see the description by ex-
deputy Joao Gilberto Lucas Coelho, "0 Process Constituinte de
1987," in Vania Lomonaco Bastos and Tania Moreira da Costa, eds
.
,
Constituinte: Questoes Polemicas (Brasilia: Caderno CEAC/UNB,
1988)
, pp. 9-17. The documentation on the popular amendments is
found in Comissao de Sis temat i zacao , Emendas Populares in two
volumes ( Brasilia: Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, 1987).
24= David Fleischer, "From Non-Competitive to Competitive
Elections...," pp. 58-9. Ve j a and Folha de Sao Paulo were also
used to follow the overall process.
25. One analyst gave the following composition for the Centrao:
PMDB- 141, PFL-117, PDS-27, PTB- 16, PDT-5, PS-5, and PDC-4.
Benicio Viero Schmidt, "Transicao Politica e Crise de
Governabi 1 idade no Brasil," in Vania Lomonaco Bastos and Tania
Moreira da Costa, p. 40.
26. It may be worth noting that one of the Popular Amendments for
agrarian reformed received more signatures than all the other 121
amendments; 1,200,000.
27. On different levels of implementation of the Portuguese
Constitution see Jorge Miranda, Manual de direito cons t i tucional
,
vol. I (Coimbra: Coimbra Editora, 1982), pp. 330-31 and on the
non-implementation of sections of Brazilian constitutions see
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Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Junior, Cons t i tuinte : Assembleia, Processo,
Poder (Sao Paulo: Editora Revista dos Tribunals, 1985).
28. The lack of complementary legislation was given for the
manner in which the armed forces put down the strike in mid-
November at the National Steel Company. Without such legislation
the armed forces acted in line with "already proven means". See
Folha de Sao Paulo November 27, 1988.
29. For an excellent comparative analysis see Alfred Stepan,
Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988) and specifically on
Brazil one of the best articles is walder de Goes, "Militares e
Politica. Uma Estrategia para a Democracia," in Fabio W. Reis and
Guillermo O'Donnell, eds .
,
A Democracia no Brasil: Dilemas e
Perspectivas (Sao Paulo: Editora Vertice, 1988), pp. 229-55.
30. The unwillingness of the Congress to support some of the key
proposals of the executive for the new economic plan in January
1989 can be seen as evidence of this. They rejected the proposal
for privatizing state-owned enterprises and another proposal
concerning abolishing some of the ministries was not approved due
to a lack of quorum. FBIS-LAT February 16, 1989, p. 31. It should
be noted, however, that the President may have been acting
unconstitutionally in declaring the plan under Article 62 on
provisional acts when much of the plan was clearly intended to be
permanent
.
31. On the close links between the state and unions see Amaury de
Souza and Bolivar Lamounier, "Governo e Sindicatos no Brasil: A
Perspectiva dos Anos 80," Dados 24, no. 2, pp. 139-59.
32. Interview with a consultant to lobbies in Brasilia on May 16,
1988. Ve j a gave coverage to some action by business lobbies. See
for ecample July 27, 1988, p. 35 on the involvement by different
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